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Abstract 
This paper charts the broad outlines of the Mozarnbican system of urban and regional 
planning since independence in 1975. It begins with a description of the context of social 
revolution and externally instigated counter-revolution that provide the backdrop for life and 
policy in Mozambique. The establishment and operation of the spatial planning system are 
then considered, with a detailed examination of the policies developed in the context of the 
continuing civil war. The principal foci are urban planning, spatial planning in the strategic 
Beira corridor and a recent regionally based programme of priority districts. The conclusion 
considers the extent to which historical patterns of uneven development in Mozambique are 
being reproduced and intensified by the situation [l] in the country. 
The Context 
As a broad overview of urban and regional planning in post-independence Mozambique, this 
article inevitably touches on a number of issues that require much more elaboration than can 
be attempted here. The civil war is just the first of these; it must be both the starting point 
and the backdrop to the subsequent analysis, for its complexities are manifold. 
Since gaining independence from Portugal in 1975, Mozambique, under the radical 
leadership of Frelimo [2], has undergone social revolution. As a new independent actor in the 
international arena, Mozambique established a wide range of diplomatic and military 
alliances, joining the "frontline states" and becoming a founder member of the Southern 
African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980, besides establishing 
close relations with the USSR and other "socialist7' states in Eastern Europe and elsewhere in 
the Third World. These realignments were accompanied by intensive efforts at ideological 
reorientation .and the creation of a new constitutional and legal system on Marxist-Leninist 
lines (Egero, 1987). However, the country has also experienced an externally instigated 
counter-revolution mediated through the rebel movement of Renamo [3], leading to a 
destructive civil war (Sidaway 1992; Vines 1991). Whilst the war has a varied texture, 
reflecting local strategic and political conditions, much of Mozambique is in a chaotic state. 
By the late 1980s, total economic output was at about one quarter, in real terms, of its level at 
independence (Hermele, 1988) and recovery since then under the aegis of an IMF 
administered Programma de Rehabilitagao Economics (Economic Rehabilitation 
Programme, or PRE) has been both limited and socially divisive (Green, 1989; Marshall, 
1990; Wuyts, 1991). 
The impact of warfare on socio-spatial organization in many Third World post-revolutionary 
states was one of the principal themes considered in the only book-length comparative study 
of urban and regional planning in what was termed "the socialist Third World": those post 
revolutionary states in the Third World that had embraced Marxism-Leninism or variants of 
radical socialism (Forbes and Thrift, 1987). Amongst such states, Mozambique was certainly 
not alone in having faced externally funded destabilization in the 1980s (Halliday, 1989). 
Yet, as Saul (1985) has suggested, because the fighting in Mozambique has been part of a 
war of attrition against civilians and the state itself, rather than of dramatic military 
engagements, for the outside world the conflict has remained largely forgotten. In 
Mozambique itself, however, the war is never far away and the human cost has been 
enormous. Up to a third of Mozambique's population of 16 million has been directly affected 
by it. More than one and a half million people have been displaced from their homes within 
the country and there are also well over one million Mozambican refugees in neighbouring 
states. More than six million Mozambicans continue to face chronic food shortages 
(Cammack, 1988; Ratilal, 1990) and a recent survey collating data from a range of databases 
ranked Mozambique second only to Afghanistan amongst "The most unfortunate nations in 
the world" (Jongman, 1990). 
In response to Frelimo's inability to maintain territorial control and security, Zimbabwe has 
since 1982 deployed troops to guard the strategic Beira corridor. Without this military 
deployment, which by 1987 has grown to about 10,000 soldiers, Zimbabwe's shortest route 
to a port would be closed. From 1984 to the end of 1990, Zimbabwe also deployed a 
motorised division for the escort of commercial convoys through Tete to Malawi. At the time 
of writing there are still some 7,000 Zimbabwean troops in the Beira corridor. From 1986 to 
1988, Tanzania also deployed troops in northern Mozambique, and since 1987 a battalion of 
Malawian troops has been guarding the Nacala link. This presence of foreign troops indicates 
the salience of Mozambique's geopolitical location, as a series of transport corridors vital to 
Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe - a factor that has also had profound bearing on its internal 
geography. For example, the aim of the state to minimize urbanization rates by a dual system 
of residence permits and the extension of social and economic infrastructure to the 
countryside, documented by Friedmann (1980) and returned to below, has been hopelessly 
frustrated. Millions of people have fled (or have been forced by the Mozambican army) 
from the countryside to areas with at least a minimum of security in order to escape from the 
conflict (Africa Watch, 1992). 
Given this context of war and the accompanying social and political dislocation, the scope 
for state intervention in spatial planning has been limited in the severest of fashions. Indeed, 
Frelimo has lost control of much of rural Mozambique (see Figure 1). Furthermore, largely as 
a result of the past decade or so of war, Mozambique has become the prime example of an 
aid-dependent state. Writing about this theme three years ago, Torp (1989: p 79) then felt 
Mozambique was becoming an "aid-economy". The combination of these flows of capital 
and goods with the failure of Frelimo's economic, political and social objectives and the 
collapse of "socialist values" meant that the predominant trend had become a struggle within 
the Party and state apparatuses between those who personally and as a group sought the 
maximum personal benefit from the foreign assistance programmes. In the 1990s "aid- 
dependency" has, if anything, become more pronounced [4] and access to the bases of social 
power for Mozambicans increasingly dependent on their relationship to the flows and sources 
of foreign aid. Hanlon (1991), in a well documented account, has argued that the external 
dependence has become so great and the collapse so severe that Mozambique is being, in a 
de facto sense, "recolonised": both the autonomy and administrative capacity of the already 
weakened Mozambican state have been undermined as its dependence on external aid has 
increased (cf Mittleman, 199 1). 
In terms of the limitations to sovereignty, however, the reduction of the Frelimo-led state to 
towns and a set of barely secure (or in some cases wholly insecure) corridors patrolled by 
foreign (i.e. Zimbabwean and Malawian) troops is an equally profound limitation. With these 
themes in mind a section of the paper will examine the Beira corridor in context, as a 
concrete and geographically specific example of the limits to Mozambican sovereignty. To 
start with, however, the structure and operation of state-directed spatial planning activities 
will be considered. For, despite the war, explicit spatial policy has continued to be designed 
and implemented, albeit with dramatically adapted goals and constrained scope. 
The Framework for Territorial Planning 
Mozambique is a fairly centralized, unitary state, divided into ten provinces (see Figure 1). In 
turn, the provinces are divided into districts, administrative posts and localities. The capital 
and other cities are administered by appointed Conselhos Executivos (Executive Councils). 
Within their boundaries, the Conselhos Executivos are nominally responsible for planning 
activity. In practice, however, the provincial offices of the National Institute for Physical 
Planning produce land-use plans for urban areas. 
The Znstituto Nacional de Planeamento Fisico (National Institute of Physical Planning, or 
INPF) is the co-ordinating body for territorially based planning. It was not actually 
established until 1983, some eight years after Mozambican independence. Since then the 
impact of the war, specifically the loss of state control over large swathes of territory, as 
referred to above, has limited the scope for planning in rural areas and for regional planning 
in general. Hence the primary role of the INPP and its local offices has been urban planning, 
which is the first and principal theme that will be considered below. The INPF has also 
recently been involved in producing plans for a number of priority districts identified as part 
of a new, and potentially significant, programme. The Programma dos Distritos Prioritarios 
(Priority District Programme, or PDP) is the closest to an explicit, regionally based 
programme that Mozambique has seen since the 1970s. As such, it is considered in some 
detail in a later section. Together with the Ministry of Agriculture, the INPF has also been 
involved in the demarcation of Zonas Verdes (Green Zones) for agricultural production 
around Mozambican cities. These activities will also be given brief consideration. However, 
since it has been documented elsewhere (Araujo, 1986, 1988) and has been eclipsed by the 
consequence of the war (Sidaway, 1991a), rural settlement policy and the role of the INgF 
therein will not be addressed here. 
Until the establishment of the INPF, urban planning was one of the responsibilities of the 
Direcgdo Nacional de Habitagdo (National Housing Directorate or DNH) that had been 
founded in 1978 (Jenkins, 1990; Pinsky, 1982, 1985). In turn, the DNH had absorbed the few 
urban planning offices that had been established during colonialism. Beyond these municipal 
offices the colonial state had made no formal provision for the national co-ordination of 
territorially based planning. The establishment of the INPF changed this, at least on paper. 
The mandate of the INPF defined its roles as: 
(a) To study and propose a better distribution of economic activity and of 
"human agglomerations" in territory. 
(b) To participate in the definition and the implementation of programmes 
and projects of development, so as to ensure that the physical aspects - 
ecological and infrastructural - will be considered, as well to offer a 
guarantee of correct physical relations between envisaged or current 
projects. 
(c) To acquire, systemize and transmit information of a geographical order 
so as to have better knowledge on the territory and its use. 
(d) To train technical staff in the areas of physical planning (INPF, 1986, 
my translation). 
The document also referred to the problems likely to result from the shortage of staff and 
from the "anarchical" situation in implementation of land law (a theme that cannot be 
considered in detail here). [5]. 
In formal terms, the INPF was given an equal status to sectoral economic planning. However, 
in practice, its role has principally remained that of an advisory body to other institutions and 
its impact has depended very much on individual contacts and collaboration. Moreover, 
many of the provincial offices have become increasingly ineffective through the lack of 
financial and technical support. Co-ordination and contact between Maputo and the 
provincial offices is frequently weak, a phenomenon reinforced by the war-related 
dislocation. Furthermore, the role of physical planning is often not understood within other, 
longer established, state structures. 
For example, the same document that defines the principles and rationale of physical 
planning in Mozambique admits that 
In our professional practice, we occasionally meet situations in 
which we have to explain what is our competence, what is our 
area of intervention. It has not been rare to meet people who 
think that physical planning is only about the demarcation of 
building plots. (INPF, 1986, my translation) 
Similarly, a 1991 report describing the activities of the INPF since its creation notes that 
The large battle limiting the INPF since its creation has been its 
recognition, in the [wider] political-institutional ambit, as an 
' institution that has to effectively control the process of 
occupation of physical space. Notwithstanding the numerous 
official declarations on the role of physical planning in the 
context of the development of the country little attention has 
been given to this question on the part of the government, 
including the National Planning Commission .... As a result a 
vicious circle has been generated in which the INPF does not 
have the capacity to offer services to the government because it 
does not have the necessary political, financial and institutional 
support; and by not offering services, it does not succeed in 
catching the attention of the government for [the resolution of] 
its operational problems. pias,  1991 : 19, my translation) 
Accounting for this requires consideration of both the colonial legacy and of the post- 
independence institutional and political contexts of spatial planning, as well as reference to 
the shifting backdrop of the Mozambican situation. 
The Colonial Legacy 
"Louren~o Marques, cidade de cimento. Erguida para 
demarcar bem a diferenca entre nos e OS colonos ... 99 
("Lourenso Marques, city of cement [6], built high to mark 
well the difference between us and the colonists ...") 
(Machel, 1980: 17-18) 
In the first place, the lack of recognition referred to in the proceeding section reflects the 
legacy of the low status given to the formal machinery of spatial planning in the colonial 
state apparatus. It must be said that, as well as implanting a characteristic architectural style, 
Portugal did transmit some formal urban planning ideas and practices to its overseas 
territories (Kubler and Soria, 1959; Cahen 1989). It is also important to recognise that, in 
addition to formal planning, a network of norms, regulations and modes of operation 
structure the colonial-built environment (King, 1990). In the case of the Portuguese colonial 
cities in Africa, it has been argued that these norms and the influx of settlers generated a 
distinctive "Lusitanian" form of the African colonial city (Cahen, 1989; Sidaway, 1991). 
However, the tradition of formal urban planning in modern Portugal was weak and its form 
derived from countries where urban planning was more developed (Williams, 1984). Despite 
earlier grand schemes, such as Pombal's eighteenth-century reconstruction of central Lisbon 
on a neo-Classical grid following the devastating earthquake of 1755 (Franca, 1977) and 
isolated redevelopments in cities such as Oporto (de Oliveira, 1973), town planning was in 
no way institutionalized in Portugal until after the establishment of the Estado Novo in the 
1930s. Even then, the urban planning acts passed in 1934 and 1944 requiring municipalities 
to draw up plans had limited impact, given the shortage of qualified personnel and frequent 
lack of local resources (Goncalves, 1977). In Portuguese colonies, where these deficiencies 
were even more pronounced, formal urban planning remained relatively poorly developed up 
to independence. In Mozambique, the plans that were made, notably for Beira and Lourengo 
Marques in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, focused on the expansion of the physical 
infrastructure, with particular emphasis on road schemes as the basis for state facilitated 
private development (Mendes, 1986). 
Hence the legacy inherited by the newly independent state was of a weakly developed urban 
planning, mainly devoted to infrastructural projects. In the fust instance, these benefited 
capital and the security of the state itself, whilst the indigenous population barely derived any 
benefits at all. Limited ventures in the late 1950s (Rita-Ferreira 1967-1968) and an attempt in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s to win indigenous political support on the part of the colonial 
administration provided some canico [7] (cane construction) areas around Lourengo Marques 
with public taps and refuse collection services. In addition, a number of roads in these areas 
of the city were straightened and sometimes surfaced to facilitate access, but the primary 
motivation for this "development" was to enhance security (Guedes 1971; Saevfors 1986). In 
short, Mozambique was no exception to the situation described by King (1976; 1990), 
O'Conner (1976) and Simon (1988; 1992), whereby urban planning in colonial sub-Saharan 
African had, in the main, reinforced elite interests. 
Independence, under a radical government committed to socialist transformation created a 
new prospect - or so it seemed. 
Planning in Urban and Peri-Urban Areas Since Independence 
Whilst there are a number of accounts of urban planning under the colonial system (Mendes 
1986; Rita-Ferreira 1967-1968) and a bibliographical guide to the history of urbanism in 
Maputo during colonialism (Pedro Roque 1987), there are only very limited published 
sources on which to draw for an account of urban planning in Mozambique since 
independence. A recent general survey of housing policies in post-independence 
Mozambique (Jenkins 1990) contains little information on urban planning per se. Mendes 
(1988; 1989) makes some consideration of urban planning, in papers on the structure of slum 
and squatter settlements in Maputo and on the broad repercussions of independence on the 
city. However, Pinsky's (1982; 1985) short papers still remain the most substantial published 
account of urban planning in post-independence Mozambique. He argued that, in line with 
the wider formal commitment of the state to socialism and popular participation, an expanded 
system or urban planning could begin to serve mass interests much more widely. 
Pinsky focused on the improvements, and popular participation achieved a pilot upgrading 
scheme in the Maputo canico suburb of Maxaquene. As his and Saevfor's (1986) more 
focused account show, the Maxaquene project involved approximately 45,000 residents and 
provided improved drainage and sanitation, social infrastructure and physical reorganization 
of the bairro (neighbourhood) on a grid basis. The upgrading was implemented by the DNH. 
In turn, the experiences from this project formed the basis for a set of resolutions on 
urbanism in the report of the "First National Meeting of Cities and Communal Bairros" in 
February 1979 (Mo~ambique, 1979) and for a subsequent national meeting on urban 
planning bringing together staff from provincial planning offices (Mogambique, 1982). 
However, the project was not replicated, owing to a combination of logistical and political 
constraints that are considered below. Furthermore, even at the time of the project and before 
the subsequent, war-generated, influx of deslocados (displaced people), it incorporated only a 
small percentage of the total number of canico dwellers in Maputo alone. 
More important than the Maxaquene project per se was the fact that the nationalization of 
land meant that dwellers in the canico areas were no longer subject to arbitrary removal. 
Forced "removals" had sometimes been applied under the colonial state, when the owners of 
land on which there were canico dwellings decided to "develop" such areas. Though 
uncodified (but with a formal basis in the new post-independence Land Law), compensation 
has been awarded by the authorities whenever compulsory demolitions have had to take 
place. This amounts to "material in kind", including cement where cement houses in the 
broader canico areas have had to be demolished. 
Aside from this, the Conselhos Executivos (Executive Councils) of each town and city, which 
have been nominally responsible for planning in urban areas (in co-operation with the 
national or relevant provincial office of the INPF), have generally lacked the personnel and 
resources to develop comprehensive planning programmes and interventions. In fact, outside 
Maputo, it is only in Beira, Narnpula, Quelimane and Nacala, that the Conselhos Executivos 
have developed planning programmes. Even in Maputo, the limit of Conselho Executivo 
"planning9' activity has been development control, site survey and land allocation (Jenkins 
1990). 
Additionally, since 1987 the Maputo Conselho Executivo has contained a semi-autonomous 
unit working with World Bank financing. This is a part of a scheme to provide sites and low 
interest loans for the construction of new "middle income" housing in selected bairros. 
Provided that the new construction is according to one of a number of standard plans, the 
usually cumbersome planning permission process is by-passed (UNHCS - Habitath4inisterio 
de Constnqao e Aguas 1990; Jenkins 1990). However, this project is not a Maxaquene-style 
upgrading, and the beneficiaries are mostly comparatively well-off residents in the cidade de 
cimento who are in a position to take up the loans offered by the project and hence to move 
out of state-owned property in, or near to, the centre of Maputo. 
Yet the Conselho Executivo in Maputo and in other cities, enjoys a relative political clout (in 
particular vis-8-vis the IMPF), derived from the direct linkages it has to the higher party-state 
apparatus and its control over funds that originate from the central government (Sidaway 
1991a; 1991 b). Although they are all dependent on such central funding and have no powers 
to raise funds locally, the Conselhos Executivos do have the power to facilitate, or block, the 
schemes produced by other state agencies such as the INPF. For example, an overall structure 
plan for Maputo produced by the INPF and presented for approval to the Conselho Executivo 
in May 1985 elicited no response and was not approved. [8] This reflected and resulted from 
the general lack of recognition of the role and potential benefits of urban planning and of the 
INBF, and disputes between the policy outlined in the plan and the Conselho Executivo 
policy conceining the question of appropriate plot sizes within the cidade de canico. The 
INPF proposed variable plot sizes, with more land available to those in the most peripheral 
areas, but this was resisted by the Conselho Executivo (Henrique, 1989), which sought a 
uniform plot size. Although the plan was resubmitted in 1988, it had been overtaken by wider 
events and the continued influx of deslocados had rendered it outdated. 
As was noted in the introductory section, the aim of minimizing urbanization rates through a 
combination of controls on movement (Sidaway, 1991a), an extension of social infrastructure 
to the countryside (Friedmann, 1980) and rural collectivization (Araujo, 1988) have been 
overtaken and hopelessly frustrated by the wider situation in Mozambique. The war and 
economic crisis have compounded the problems and limited the scope for the establishment 
and operation of a progressive urban planning system that from the outset was chronically 
under-equipped in human and technical terms and given low priority by other sections of the 
state apparatus. The massive influx into peri-urban areas of deslocados and the increasingly 
severe fiscal and logistical constraints have, in themselves, meant that there could not be 
much possibility of expanding or replicating the type of relatively successful canico- 
upgrading project carried out in Maxaquene. 
However, there is more to the failure to extend or reproduce the upgrading than such 
constraints. In effect, a conflict between the "bottom up" style associated with the 
Maxaquene project and a more technocratic and elitist style of planning concerned with 
"modern", "advanced" projects, such as roads and cement buildings, has never disappeared. 
Several enduring features of the colonial system must again be referred to here. In the first 
place, elements of the "modernizing" and, in original terms, "civilizing" mission of the 
colonial state were reproduced in the Frelimo "party-state" (Cahen, 1985; 1987; 1990). The 
focus on grandiose schemes and the voluntarist "radical modernization" present in Frelimo 
strategy, also impacted on the urban planning process. As in the wider experience of 
Mozambique; the focus on grand projects within the "state socialist" model combined with 
and tended to reinforce these tendencies (Hanlon, 1984; Young 1988). The relative weakness 
of the INPF has also been accentuated by the shortage of skilled personnel (from its creation, 
it has relied on technical support from foreign cooperantes): a legacy of the low profile of 
planning under colonialism and, in more general terms, of the limited educational 
opportunities available to Mozambicans under the colonial system. 
Another (related) factor has been the clash between those, such as the planners, who have 
been defined and perceive themselves fundamentally as "technicos" (technician ) and those 
who are "politicos" (politicians) or "administradores" (administrators). This type of 
dichotomy is hardly confined to Mozambique (Thompson, 1961), although it was particularly 
profound there under colonialism, as both Moreira's (1963) and Bailey's (1969) accounts 
acknowledged. 
As has frequently been noted, urban and regional planning often tends to be regarded by its 
practitioners as a purely technical and "professional" practice abstracted from political and 
social considerations. In the main, Mozambique was no exception to this. The colonial 
Estado Novo encouraged the idea of a91 forms of state intervention as rational, technical and 
serving the higher interests of the "nation" and/or empire. Although they were reformulated, 
such conceptions did not disappear in 1975. After independence not only did the legacy of an 
artificial, but significant, division between the "technical" and the "political" persist, it was 
maintained by the "new" system. The terminology applied is revealing; the "National 
Institute for Physical Planning" (INPF) is usually seen (including by many who work within 
it) as a "technical" body. In a similar vein to the focus on "grand projects", post- 
independence politics reproduced attitudes and values imbibed during colonialism. In this 
case, the way in which popular participation was constrained by Marxist-Leninist politics 
must also be acknowledged as having considerable impact. After independence Frelimo 
adopted a Marxist-Leninist model associated with a vision of state-led transition to socialism 
as referred to in the introduction. Although it did contain participatory elements, these 
tended to be swamped by bureaucracy and centralism. Policy was usually made in Maputo 
and transmitted to the provinces without taking into account local conditions. Indeed, within 
an expanding literature on the social and political roots of the war, it is argued that such 
centralization and lack of sensitivity to specific local milieu generated discontents that have 
contributed to external destabilization (Hall, 1990; Sidaway, 1992; Vines, 1991). Again these 
are themes that cannot be considered in detail here. They are mentioned because the response 
to the war and government attempts to restabilise the situation in Mozambique are central to 
the scheme of "regional" scale planning described below. However, before this is considered, 
the scheme for Zonas Verdes (Green Zones) must be mentioned. 
Although the origins of a state-orchestrated project to boost food production in the peri-urban 
areas of Maputo go back to just after independence, it was not until l980 that an official 
structure was established for the purpose. The Gabinete das a n a s  Verdes (Green Zones 
Office or GZV), which falls within the Conselho Executive of the city of Maputo, was 
created to accompany the so-called "Political and Organisational Offensive" launched by 
Samora Machel at the start of the decade. In line with the strategy that later resurfaced in 
other forced population movements [9] (Urdang, 1989), one of the principal objectives of the 
Green Zone project was to provide work for those whom the state defined as "criminals" or 
"marginals". 
Because of this focus, work in the Zonas Verdes was initially seen as a punishment. 
However, after a few years greater stress was put on the contribution to food production. 
Particularly during the severe food shortages experienced in urban areas during the early and 
mid-1980s, acquiring access to a machamba (a small plot of land) in the Zonas Verdes 
became attractive to city dwellers. Between 1982 and 1984 the "Production Units" managed 
by the Gabinete das Zonas Verdes were dismantled and the land passed to co-operatives and 
farnily- scale private farms, with the provision of fertilisers, seeds, basic tools and other 
inputs at low cost. During this time, a number of foreign NGOs became involved in 
supporting the project and a particular individual, an Italian priest (Sr Prosperino), played a 
major role in mobilizing support. 
As of 1989, the structure of land utilization was as follows: 390 private farms totalling 2,200 
hectares; 29' co-operative farms covering 750 hectares with a total of 11,000 members, 95 
per cent of whom were women; and over 58,000 family farms covering 12,301 hectares. The 
58,000 families represent one-third of the population of the Maputo area. [l01 As for the 
INPF role, since the mid-1980s, it has been involved in survey work within the Zonas 
Verdes. This involved mapping the most fertile land in order to preserve it for agricultural 
production, since parts of the zone lie on land that was earlier scheduled to be used for 
settlement, or may be spontaneously occupied by deslocados. Given that only about 16 per 
cent of the Green Zone is of high fertility, this task has particular importance. Yet, whilst 
there has been relatively good co-operation between the INPF and the GZV, neither has a 
sufficiently well developed linkage to the Ministry of Agriculture. In part, this is a reflection 
of the low status of both institutions in the eyes of a well established prestige ministry. In 
turn this must be related back to the themes considered in the foregoing section, in so far as it 
arises from the plethora of state agencies and the pervasive tendency towards the 
prioritization of "grand" projects. 
Yet, despite this, and although little detailed information is available concerning the above 
issues, the Green Zones, since replicated around other Mozambican cities, have been widely 
acknowledged as a success, providing food, employment and opportunities for women [ l  l ]  
(who are the main farmers in these areas) in a sustainable context (Gentili, 1989; Mulder, 
1989; Urdang, 1989; White, 1985). The location in peri-urban areas means that there has 
generally been sufficient security to permit continuous cultivation. In war-torn Mozambique, 
physical security has become the prerequisite to development* As the next section shows, this 
has been particularly evident in the strategic Beira corridor. 
The Beira Corridor in Context 
The presence of the Zimbabwean National Army in Mozambique has both signified and 
cemented the Maputo-Harare axis, geopolitically one of the most important relationships in 
the region. The protection accorded to the strategically vital transport links between the 
Zimbabwean frontier and the port of Beira has greatly enhanced the security of many areas 
along the Beira corridor. Indeed, the relative security of areas adjoining the corridor has 
resulted in a massive influx of deslocados. Travelling along the corridor in 1989, one 
observer described the result as "forming a strange linear city, nearly two hundred miles 
long, of reed-and-mud huts"(Finnegan, 1989:76). 
The relative security offered to parts of Manica and Sofala provinces by the foreign troops, 
the comparatively fertile land and moist climate and, not least, the historic precedent of 
foreign (British and Rhodesian) investment in the region of the corridor, have also resulted in 
it and adjoining areas being leading domains of foreign direct investment and joint ventures 
in contemporary Mozambique beyond Maputo (as Figure 2 indicates). In general, the Beira 
Corridor has been held up as something of a model for Mozambican-Zimbabwean co- 
operation, private-sector involvement, and for the SADCC project of reducing mutual 
dependence on South Africa. 
It is certainly true that Beira and the corridor have had immense strategic significance to the 
frontline states, in particular to Zimbabwe. In the early 1980s, at the same time that South 
African-orchestrated destabilization was having significant consequences for Mozambique, 
South Africa closed its border with Zimbabwe on several occasions, disrupting traffic and 
causing successive fuel crises. By 1986, virtually all of Zimbabwe's petrochemical imports 
were passing through the pipeline or road and rail links to Beira (Morna, 1988). The 
lessening of tensions in southern Africa since the 1989 advent of the De Klerk administration 
in South Africa means that the strategic significance of the Beira corridor has diminished 
latterly, although it has not altogether disappeared. Indeed, geo-strategic factors aside, Beira 
remains the "natural" outlet for Zimbabwean imports and exports: 1,379 kilometres nearer to 
Harare than the nearest South African port at Durban. 
As for the city itself, Beira has not been the centre for state structures in the way Maputo 
has. [l21 However, located at the end of the road, rail and also, since 1965, the pipeline links 
to Zimbabwe and beyond, it has been a crucial node. Formerly it was a point of articulation 
between the Southern Rhodesian colonial settler-state, colonial Mozambique and the wider 
world system. Latterly it has been part of a geo-strategic axis between independent 
Mozambique and independent Zimbabwe, referred to above. Such shifts in the international 
relationships and power structures in which Beira is embedded have profoundly influenced 
the city since its creation just over one hundred years ago. 
Indeed, the very foundation of Beira was the result of such wider strategic and geopolitical 
changes. The Portuguese attempt at "effective occupation" in order to meet the demands of 
the Berlin Congress, led to the creation of a new military post in 1887 at a strategic location 
in relationship to the declining indigenous Gaza empire. This was where the city of Beira 
would later grow (dos Muchangos, 1989; Liesegang, 1989; Lobato, 1981). It was actually the 
granting of a concession to the Mozambique Company in 1891 that triggered growth. Such 
concessions were part of a somewhat desperate scheme on the Portuguese part to promote 
"effective occupation" (Mewitt, 198 1; Smith, 1991; Vail, 1976). Unable to "pacify" vast 
areas of the territory that had been conceded to it and unwilling to invest there, the company 
focused on developing Beira and a railway to Rhodesia (Nunes, 1929; Vai, 1976). The 
railway was finished in 1900 and the city remained under the jurisdiction of the Mozambique 
Company which itself had come under British financial control early in the twentieth century. 
Meanwhile, British and Rhodesian influence became paramount in Beira. British currency 
was in use in the city and an English-language newspaper even appeared. The British 
constructed another railway linking the city to Nyasaland (Vail, 1975). Hence, not only did 
Beira's hinterland have separate administration and tariff systems until 1941 (when the lease 
of the Mozambique Company finally expired), but even after that time, the city had closer 
links with neighbouring British colonies (subsequently independent Malawi and UDI 
Rhodesia) than with the rest of Mozambique. 
Apart from the nationalization of the port in 1948 and of the railway to Rhodesia in 1949, 
none of this had really changed when the events of 1974 precipitated the collapse of the 
colonial system. By the time of Mozambican independence, Beira had grown to be the 
second city of Mozambique, with a population in excess of 110,000 (dos Muchangos, 1989). 
It was also a major conduit for Rhodesian "sanctions busting". 
After Mozambican independence, Frelimo abided by UN sanctions against Rhodesia, closing 
the border at Machipanda from 4 March 1976. One of the results was that traffic through 
Beira port collapsed. Frelimo's solidarity may have cemented its relations with ZANU and 
have been a further nail in the coffin for the Smith regime, but it also removed much of 
Beira's raison d'itre. Without its hinterland and buffeted by the economic crisis that 
accompanied the departure of the settler population, the economic base and physical fabric of 
the city declined. There was a brief respite after Zimbabwean independence when, in line 
with the wider optimistic climate in Mozambique, it was hoped that recovery (and even 
socialist transition) were firmly on the agenda. Trade through the port recovered somewhat, 
but it was not long before the war and economic crisis of the 1980s closed in on the city. 
In the last few years, the growing trade through the Beira corridor and the reintegration of 
Beira into the broader regional and global system have generated a revival, although with 
only limited impact on the conditions for the majority of the population in the city. Between 
1977 and 1979, a plan for the rehabilitation of the port was developed with funding from the 
Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation. However, implementation of the plans had 
to wait until after the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980. 
Since Zimbabwe was the hub of the southern Africa transportation network north of the 
Limpopo River, the sanctions and border closures following Rhodesia's Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in 1965 prevented the majority-ruled states of the region from 
establishing substantive transport co-operation. The foundation in 1980 of the Southern 
African Development Coordination Conference with the official aim of reducing the mutual 
dependence of its members on South Africa, laid the basis for the co-ordinated rehabilitation 
of the port. Yet, whilst a number of rehabilitation schemes got underway during the first half 
of the B980s, it was not until 1985 that a comprehensive programme was developed - based 
on the plan referred to above. Then, with Zimbabwean troops offering the minimum requisite 
security to the corridor, a ten-year development programme for the Beira corridor was 
formulated with assistance from the European Community and the SADCC. 
When the plan was completed the Mozambican government created (by Joint Ministerial 
Decree, 19 December 1985) the Gabinete do Corredor da Beira (Beira Corridor Authority) 
within the Ministry of Ports, Railways and Merchant Shipping. The Gabinete became 
responsible for mobilizing the capital and co-ordinating the rehabilitation of the port, 
including the roads, housing and training of the workfsrce. The projects, however, have been 
entirely funded by foreign aid, which is anticipated to total U5$670 million over the ten years 
to 1995. [l31 Furthermore, although the rehabilitation of the port offered long-term 
prospects for.the rehabilitation of the city, so far the development has been of dependent and 
enclave nature. Within the port the rehabilitation makes for a dynamic atmosphere, but for 
the city in general the indications of recovery are much more limited and contradictory in 
effect. As a spin-off from the Beira port and corridor development, there is now a programme 
to rehabilitate the physical infrastructures of the town. By the end of 1990, seven such 
rehabilitation projects were underway (Beira Corridor Authority 1991). In general, however, 
the dynamism of the quasi-internationalized zone within the F i y  bounded confines of the 
port and the opportunities for Mozambicans who are able to find employment on the projects 
therein contrast starkly with the prospects for those outside the small merchant and trading 
group in the city who also benefit directly or indirectly from the infrastructural projects. As 
in colonial times (Coimbra, 1970), the majority of the population who reside in the cidade de 
canico are marginalized. Furthermore, although no published figures on the theme are 
available, it is clear that the vast majority of the required materials, equipment and skilled 
personnel are "imported". 
In addition to the massive project co-ordinated through the Gabinete, the Beira Corridor 
Group (BCG), a private organizsation funded by Zimbabwean capital with its head office in 
Harare, was founded in 1986. The BCG seeks to profit from participation in the rehabilitation 
projects as well as making related investments. The existence of an "internationalized" port 
largely financed and operated by foreign capital, with investments coming from Zimbabwe, 
echoes the historical pattern of Beira as an entrep6t for Rhodesia. In a very broad sense the 
parallel is striking. However, the sources and nature of the capital flows of today are quite 
different to those of colonial Beira. At US$1.35 million, the private capital invested by the 
BCG is only a tiny fraction of the much wider aid flows to the port and associated 
infrastructure. In the words of one report, BCG investment is "riding on the back of the 
donors putting aid money in to the corridor" (Hanlon, 1989: p 72). For Beira, as elsewhere in 
Mozambique, if large scale private capital is to follow, it will be along conduits put in place 
by international aid. 
The consequences of this, in terms of reinforcing Mozambican dependency and replicating, 
albeit in new contexts, the regional patterns of uneven development, also seem assured, if not 
widely acknowledged. As the following section indicates, the Priority District Programme 
will not reduce such disparities, even though it has been forced to consider the issue. 
The Priority District Programme 
The Programma dos Distritos Prioritarios (PDP) is also a response to the conditions 
generated by the war; a recognition that the government can focus only on limited areas of 
the national territory as well as a programme of selective economic and political 
regeneration. The impact of the programme has so far been very limited, given the continuing 
constraints of the war and a degree of reluctance by foreign NGOs to participate in the 
project on the terms offered by Mozambican ministries (Hanlon, 1991). However the PDP is 
potentially significant, in the first place as a Mozambican-designed programme that, in the 
words of a foreign consultant to the Mozambican government, 
... is better conceptualised, more contextualised, better linked 
' to political level goals and decisions, more integrally 
Mozambique's own work and more likely to be broadly 
successful in attaining its targets than any previous 
Mozambican rural development initiative. (Green, 1990a: p 12) 
As Green (1990b) has pointed out elsewhere, the programme is also, in terms of rural 
development, the "first broad front strategic initiative" in ten years. Restricted in the first 
year by fiscal constraints to only six districts, with incorporation of all forty not envisaged 
until 1995, it is admitted that the programme cannot reduce regional disparity. This, however, 
is not the aim of the PDP, although it has been forced to consider inter-provincial disparity, 
as is described below. 
The brief but valuable accounts in Hanlon (1991) and Green (1990a; 1990b) show how the 
PDP is being designed as a co-ordinated, multi-ministerial effort, and also the financial and 
logistic constraints under which it will operate. In the former sense, it is a partial break with 
the firmly top-down strategy that was pursued during the years of attempted state-led 
socialist transition. The proposed strategy includes investment in basic physical and social 
infrastructure combined with institutional development, a unified monitoring scheme and the 
preparation of district plans. 
The scheme began with the selection of the districts in 1987, based on an earlier INPF study 
of the economic potential of Mozambican districts (Mullin, Meeuws and Sumalgy, 1985). 
Since then Mozambican documentation (Frelimo, 1989; Carrilho et al, 1990) has stressed the 
economic and social goals. However, as already noted, it is clear that these are also 
conceptualized as part of a wider strategic policy of recuperation of the state and society in 
the countryside: part of a challenge to Renamo and to other "freelance" armed bandits 
operating in the situation of confusdo (confusion/disorientation) that prevails in many rural 
areas. The actual selection took into account security conditions, the grading of the districts, 
and the prospects for funding. A map indicating the location of the priority districts (see 
Figure 3) reveals a concentration along the strategic Beira, Nacala and Tete corridors and 
along the coast. 
The 40 priority districts constitute 30 per cent of the total number of Mozambican districts. 
However, in the districts selected, 60-70 per cent of the marketed agricultural production is 
produced and 50 per cent of the rural population is located. Whatever similarities it may have 
to the tried and tested regional development formulas of "growth poles" or "agropolitan 
development" (Gore, 1984; Simon, 1990; Stohr and Taylor, 1981), the programme is not a 
"conventional" regional development scheme, but a project developed in response to the 
specific conditions prevailing in Mozambique. In so far as it constitutes a regional 
development strategy, it is one where strategic considerations are paramount. Hence it makes 
no attempt to focus on the least developed districts. In the context of the wider situation in 
Mozambique, that would be impossible. Furthermore, the districts selected contain only 30 
per cent of the deslocados. Indeed, as already noted most of the districts are located along the 
coast or the transport corridors: in short, the more developed parts of Mozambique. 
However, the Priority Districts were selected so as to produce a more or less even share 
between provinces. For, in addition to the selection on the criteria noted above, there was: 
... another [criterion], of an essentially political character: the 
activity has-to be carried out in all of the country's provinces, 
in an attempt to avoid maximizing regional disequilibriums 
(Carrilho, 1990: p 3) (my translation) 
Mozambican documentation admits that without this political criterion, it would be possible 
to select districts in such a way that over 85 per cent of marketed output would be produced 
in the ones that were chosen. In this case, 75 per cent of the Priority Districts would be in 
Zarmbezia and Nampula, but a generally less fertile province such as Inhambane would be 
excluded entirely (Carrilho, 1990: p 4). It is clear that "regional disequilibrium" refers to 
inter-provincial disparity. This is related to Frelimo's concern for "national unity". It is 
recognized that a focus on one or two provinces could become a political issue if the 
programme began to have a substantive impact. 
So far, though, the PDP remains embryonic. Both the extent to which it will be able to realize 
its objectives and the ultimate form of the programme are uncertain. The respective 
provincial offices of the INPF have been involved in the preparation of the district plans 
required for the project. To date, however, the programme remains largely at the planning 
stage, despite the creation in December 1990 of the Institute de Desenvolvimento Rural 
(Institute of Rural Development, or H\TDER), a new state agency which has taken overall 
responsibility for the administration of the project. [l41 Meanwhile, the potential co- 
ordinating role of physical planning within the programme has not received sufficient support 
either from the respective provincial governments or particular ministries, which still tend to 
put forward their own projects without seeking co-ordination. [IS] The general lack of status 
which spatisil/physical planning suffers from, referred to earlier in the section on urban 
planning, is not something that has yet been transcended in the nascent PDP. Furthermore, 
and critically, it seems that the international donor community, who in Hanlon's (1991) terms 
now "call the shots" in Mozambique, has done little to support the programme. In fact, many 
international agencies have tended to reinforce the fragmentation of policy and the tendency 
to by-pass the planning system. 
Conclusions 
It is notable that the PDP is directed at regeneration, with the state playing a facilitating and 
not a directinaeading role. As such, it is a long way from the policies of the first ten years 
after independence during which Frelimo sought, in increasingly difficult circumstances, to 
direct Mozambican economy and society. The very failure of Frelimo's project of socialist 
development and transformation and the ensuing enfeeblement of the state and conditions of 
civil war have limited the capacity for urban and regional planning in general. In the last few 
years the collapse of socialist ideology has seen Frelimo embrace a pro-capitalist stance. 
Whilst this has been accompanied by a limited economic recovery, it has also seen increasing 
social inequality and a greater subordination of Mozambique to the regional nodes and global 
cores of the 'world capitalist system than at any time since independence. [l61 (Hanlon, 
1991; Mittleman, 1991; Saul, 1991; Wyuts, 1991). 
Furthermore, there has been a profound structural continuity in the general pattern of uneven 
development in Mozambique. It is still largely a country of corridors that provide transit 
routes for its neighbours, epitomized by the Beira corridor. In fact, the war has accentuated 
the differences between urban areas and the territory as a whole. Despite the recent rise in 
urban crime and violence (Independent, 26 September 1991), the former are relatively secure 
islands in a sea of conflict. The war may ebb and flow according to changing strategic and 
tactical conditions, but the very unpredictability that characterizes the security situation in 
large areas of the Mozambican countryside contrasts starkly with the main towns. Yet, even 
in a post-war scenario, the scope for transcending the inherited patterns of uneven 
development remains minimal. Although an essay produced for Frelimo's Fifth Congress in 
1989 on the theme of "uneven development in Mozambique" argued that the patterns of 
uneven development in the country threatened national unity and were neither economically 
nor environmentally "rational" (Pereira, 1989), the capacity for the state to alter this in the 
short or medium term is severely limited. 
Meanwhile direct negotiations to end the war have been slow in producing results since their 
commencement in 1990, as the combatants continue to jockey for the best negotiating 
position (Africa Confidential, 1991a; 1991b; 1991c; 1991d; 1992). The future for the 
Mozambican regime is uncertain, given that following a peace accord multi-party elections 
will be held. However, like the Mozambican people and the Mozambican state, the formal 
territorial planning machinery in Mozambique continues to struggle against overwhelming 
odds and will. face new challenges once the war is finally ended. 
* The paper focuses on the experience between 1975 and up to the end of 1990. Since 
then, a number of significant changes have taken place. The IMPF has become 
increasingly marginalized and now exists more "on paper" than as a functioning entity. 
The newly founded lnstituto de Desenvolvimento Rural (Institute of Rural 
Development, or INDER) has taken over responsibility for the priority district 
programme. Most significantly of all, negotiations between Frelimo and Renamo have 
reached an advanced stage and on the 7th August 1992 Renamo leader Afonso 
Dhlakama and President Joaquirn Chissano agreed to sign a cease-fire on the 1st 
October 1992 in Gaborone. The significance of these developments will be detailed in 
an expanded and updated version of this paper which is due to be published in the 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research in 1993-94. 
1 In Mozambique, the war and ensuing crisis are often referred to as "a sitzuzgo" (the 
situation). 
2 Prior to 1975 Mozambique was ruled from Lisbon, as part of the wider Portuguese 
empire. The radical nationalist movement of the Frente de Liberta~lio de Mocambique 
(Frelimo), formed in exile in Tanzania in 1962 from an amalgam of resistance groups, 
had launched a guerrilla war for independence on the 25th September 1964. Ultimately, 
the loss by the Portuguese armed forces of the military initiative in parts of 
Mozambique, as well as in Portugal's other continental African colonies of Angola and 
Guinea-Bissau, played a role in prompting the leftist Movimento das Forcas Armadas 
(MFA) to overthrow the authoritarian government of Marcelo Caetano in April 1974. 
Following this, Portugal quickly withdrew its remaining colonial possessions, and by 
the end of 1975 what had been both the first, and the most enduring, European overseas 
empire was gone. In the Mozambican case, Portugal signed an independence agreement 
with Frelimo on the 7th September 1974 and a transitional government was set up, 
leading to independence on the 25th June 1975. Frelimo formally declared itself a 
"Marxist-Leninist vanguard party" at its Third Congress in February 1977. At its Fifth 
Congress, in 1989, the party was redefined as a the vanguard of all the Mozambican 
people and references to Marxism-Leninism dropped. 
The Resistencia Nacional Mo~ambicana (Renamo) was originally set up by the 
Rhodesian security forces in 1976-1977, and for some years after Zimbabwean 
independence they were supplied and trained by the South African military (Fauvet, 
1984; Vines, 1991). In English, Renamo has often been termed the MNR (Mozambican 
National Resistance). Until recently, the Mozambican government refused to use these 
names and often still refers to the group as bandidos armados (armed bandits). 
For 1992, over 60 per cent of the state budget is projected to come from foreign aid. In 
recent years the "aid sector" has constituted around 50 per cent of the GNP (Hanlon, 
1991; Waterhouse, 1992; Wuyts, 1991). 
The theme of Mozambican land law, its application and relationship to the land-use 
planning system are considered in Sidaway (1991a) and Simon (1991a; 1991 b). 
In Mozambican cities a broad physical distinction is customarily made between the 
central cidade de cimento (cement city) and the surrounding cidade de canico (cane 
city). In turn, this relates to the distinction between a "formal" sector of private or state- 
owned buildings and an "informal" sector of unregistered private housing of cane or 
other light material. In a 1985 report it was estimated that only about 8 per cent of the 
Mozambican population lived in permanent houses of brick or cement (Forjaz, 1985). 
See note 6. 
Interview conducted with INPF official in Maputo, August 1989. 
Some observers have traced this to Machel's moralistic anti-urbanism (Henrikson, 
1978; Libby, 1987). For a discussion of this issue and of Frelimo's attitude to urbanism 
in general, see Sidaway (1991a). 
Data supplied by the GZV, Maputo. 
However in more general terms, Mozambican "physical" planning has not taken a great 
deal of account of the gendered nature of social space. 
The fact that Maputo, in the far south, is the capital of Mozambique, rather than the 
centrally located Beira, as well as the fact that Maputo's Conselho Executive receives 
the lion's share of the funding that must be shared between all such bodies nationally is 
perceived by many in Beira as part of a wider southern bias in the country. 
For a listing of the donors and projects, see Muhate (1989). 
What the impact of the creation of INDER will be remains unclear. It is located in 
offices formerly occupied by the INPF in Maputo. 
15 Interviews conducted with INPF officials in Chimoio and Maputo, April 1990. 
16 The neo-liberal orthodoxy of the World Bank and the IMF, who direct the Mozambican 
"structural adjustment" programme, has relatively little to say about the role of spatial 
planning. To what extent the broad, anti-statist and anti-planning ideology and the 
stress on "effective administration" which these powerful international agencies 
espouse are likely to affect the nature of the Mozambican spatial planning system 
remains to be seen. 
In Mozambique, officials of the Institute Nacional de Planeamento Fisico (INPF) in Maputo 
offered information and granted interviews. In addition, the research was assisted by staff 
from the Direcgao de Promogb de Znvestimemto Estrangeiro and the Direcgdo Nacional de 
Estatistica. Special thanks must also go to Bartolemeu Paulo and Aurelio Mavone in Maputo, 
Nicole Seibel in Chirnoio and Niels Molgaard in Beira. 
The author also wishes to acknowledge the comments and critique offered by David Simon, 
Tony Lemon, Ken Wilson and the organizers of and participants in the seminar at the 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 28 February 1992, where an earlier draft was presented. 
However, the responsibility for the interpretation and any errors lies with the author. 
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